in defense of a presuppositional account of slurs by Cepollaro, Bianca
In defense of a presuppositional account of slurs
This is a pre-publication version of the paper, that will appear on Language
Sciences 01/2015
Abstract
In the last ﬁfteen years philosophers and linguists have turned their at-
tention to slurs: derogatory expressions that target certain groups on the
basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality and so on. This inter-
est is due to the fact that, on the one hand, slurs possess puzzling linguistic
properties; on the other hand, the questions they pose are related to other
crucial issues, such as the descriptivism/expressivism divide, the seman-
tics/pragmatics divide and, generally speaking, the theory of meaning.
Despite these recent investigations about pejoratives, there is no widely
accepted explanation of slurs:in my paper I consider the intuitions we have
about slurs and I assess the diﬃculties that the main theories encounter
in explaining how these terms work in order to identify the phenomena
that a satisfactory account of slurs needs to explain. Then, I focus on
the pragmatic theories that deal with the notions of conventional implica-
ture and pragmatic presupposition: I assess the objections that have been
raised and I propose two ways of defending the presuppositional account,
taking into consideration the notion of cancellability. I will claim that
the reason why most pragmatic strategies seem to fail to account for slurs
is that they assume a rigid divide between conventional implicatures and
presuppositions that should not be taken for granted. Reconsidering the
relationship between these two notions gives a hint about how a pragmatic
account of slurs should look like. Finally, I assess the problem of which
presupposition slurs in fact trigger.
Keywords: slurs, presuppositions, conventional implicatures, cancellability,
hate speech.
1 Slurs and intuitions
In this section, I will present some examples1 to see what slurs are and how
they work and I'll look at the intuitions we have about these terms.
Slurs are derogatory expressions that target certain groups on the basis
of race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality and so on. Some examples of
1To do that, I am going to mention some slurs, together with other bad words. I hope
it's clear enough that I don't mean to use them, but I need to mention them to make my
explanation clearer.
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English slurs are bitch, chink, faggot, kike, nigger, wop etc. What
characterizes slurs is that they derogate people on the account of their belonging
to a certain target group. Consider (1) and (2):
1. Bianca is a wop.
2. Bianca is a jerk.
Here we see that both (1) and (2) convey an oﬀense toward Bianca, but only
(1) derogates a whole class of people, namely Italians. This is a feature that
distinguishes slurs from other insults.
A peculiarity of these words is that their oﬀensive content tends to scope
out of semantic embeddings like negations, conditionals, modals or questions.
Compare (3)-(4) and (5)-(6):
3. Biancaa is not a wop.
4. Is Bianca a wop?
5. Bianca is not a jerk.
6. Is Bianca a jerk?
Here we see that the oﬀense towards the target group conveyed by (1) is still
conveyed by (3) and (4); on the contrary, the oﬀense conveyed by (2) disappears
in (5) and (6): again we note how slurs behave diﬀerently from other insults.
In (3) and (4) we observed that the oﬀense conveyed by wop scopes out of
its embedded position; the same happens for every slur and for other kinds
of embedding, such as denials, conditionals, modals and so on. We call this
phenomenon scoping-out, a characteristic and problematic feature of slurs that
must be explained.
These few examples are just a sketch to see how slurs tend to work. Now
I would like to consider what our intuitions on slurs are. I would say that the
very ﬁrst and strong intuition is this: a slur is derogatory. This doesn't really
depend on the speaker's intention: using those words, you are usually oﬀensive,
regardless of what you meant. This leads us to a second (less obvious) intuition
about slurs: slurs are conventionally derogatory. There are several ways to be
oﬀensive; for example, through language, prosody or non-verbal communication:
many things both verbal and non-verbal could be oﬀensive, depending on the
context2. Nevertheless, slurs' oﬀensiveness hardly depends on context. Almost3
every occurrence of a slur conveys an oﬀense. The link between the slurring word
and the derogatory content seems to be conventional in this sense. Compare for
example the following utterances:
7. Shut up, you're a woman.
2About the diﬀerence between slurs and non-descriptive expletives, see Blakemore D.
(2014).
3See 3.1.2. for appropriated uses and non-derogatory uses in general.
2
8. Shut up, you're a nigger.
It seems to me that both (7) and (8) are highly derogatory, even if (8) includes
a slur, whereas (7) doesn't. My point here is to show that there is a deep
diﬀerence between (7) and (8) and this diﬀerence is linguistically interesting:
the thing is that woman can easily have non-oﬀensive occurrences, whereas
nigger tends not to. In this sense we would like to say that slurs' derogatory
content is conventional.
So far, so good: we are dealing with bad words that tend to be derogatory
every time they occur in a sentence, even if embedded. In the next section, I
turn to the question of what kind of analysis we can oﬀer for these terms.
2 Theories
In this section I would like to brieﬂy outline the main theories4 about slurs
formulated so far and consider the objections that have been formulated against
those theories. I have no aim of completeness here: for brevity's sake, I will just
sketch out in short the semantic and the pragmatic approach5.
2.1 Semantic strategies
The main defender of a semantic approach to slurs is Christopher Hom. Se-
mantic theories hold that the derogatory content of slurs is part of their truth-
conditional meaning. From a naïve semantic perspective, faggot means some-
thing like homosexual and despicable because of it. This account may seem
a plausible one. The intuition here is that a word like faggot picks out a cer-
tain set of individuals (in this case, homosexuals) and it also says something
bad about the target group (that they are despicable for being homosexual).
Since faggot and homosexual and despicable because of it are considered as
synonyms, (1) is equivalent to (2):
9. John is a faggot.
4For a more detailed exposition of the diﬀerent positions, see, among the others, Hom
(2008), Anderson and Lepore (2013a, 2013b), Whiting (2013).
There actually is a third approach, which can be called content-less, due to the work of
Ernie Lepore and Luvell Anderson. I didn't include it in this work just because my focus here
is on pragmatic strategies; the content-less approach could be sketched as follows: Anderson
and Lepore (2013a) tried to deﬂate content strategies (semantic and pragmatic), holding that
slurs do not possess derogatory force because of what they mean, but because uttering a slur
constitutes an infraction of an edict that prohibits to use them at all. This content-less strategy
probably needs to be articulated and developed further: we are still in need of an explanation
of why uttering a slur was prohibited in the ﬁrst place. Obviously, this explanation cannot
refer to the meaning of a slur, otherwise it would be viciously circular.
5A few words about the terminology: the semantic-pragmatic distinction has been used in
the literature about slurs as an easy way to distinguish two kinds of theories, but it would
have been more precise to say truth-conditional vs non-truth-conditional. Nevertheless, the
label non-truth-conditional would still be very general. In order not to mix up the standard
terminology, I will just stick to it and I will explain what I mean every time I need to.
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10. John is homosexual and despicable because of it.
This seems to be a reasonable explanation of what a slur means. Nevertheless,
we have already observed the peculiar linguistic behaviour of slurs under nega-
tion; let's compare the behaviour of a slur with the one of its corresponding
paraphrase:
11. John is not a faggot.
12. John is not homosexual and despicable because of it.
As we can see, there is no oﬀense in uttering (12); on the contrary, (11) still
displays a derogatory force; (9) and (10) display diﬀerent linguistic behaviour
when they are under embedding, so they cannot be considered as equivalent;
thus, faggot and homosexual and despicable because of it cannot be syn-
onyms as the naïve version of the semantic theory claims. What we observe in
(11) is just the same scoping-out phenomenon observed in the previous section
and semantic theories do not account for it, at least in the naïve version I've just
presented. Hom oﬀers a reﬁned semantic strategy, that consists in two moves:
an externalist turn and a distinction between derogation and oﬀense. Let's see
it in more detail. Hom (2008) describes the meaning of slurs as follows:
ought be subject to p1+...+pn, because of being d1+...+dn, all because of being
NPC*, where p1+...+pn are deontic prescriptions derived from the set of racist
practices, d1+...+dnare the negative properties derived from the racist ideology,
and NPC* is the semantic value of the appropriate nonpejorative correlate of the
epithet. For example, the epithet `chink' expresses a complex, socially construc-
ted property like: ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards,
and ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to managerial positions,
and . . . , because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and
. . . , all because of being Chinese.6
This is a reﬁned and more complex version of the naïve deﬁnition  `neutral
counterpart' and despicable because of it; the externalist turn consists in the fact
that the properties ascribed to the target group (both p1+...+pn and d1+...+dn)
are established by experts in the community (in the case of chink, the racists
count as experts; in the case of faggot, the homophobes do and so on). This
reﬁned externalist version doesn't really solve the problem noted in (9)-(12), i.e.
the scoping-out phenomenon. So here comes Hom's second move: Hom (2011)7
claims that (1), (8) and (9) are indeed derogatory, but (3), (4) and (11) are
not, despite what it might seem. To explain that, Hom introduces a distinction
between two notions: derogation, on one hand, and oﬀense, on the other. When
we attribute a slur to someone, there is an objective predication of a property
like the one described above in the quotation: that is derogation. On the
6Hom (2008), p. 431.
7Hom (2011), p. 397.
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contrary, when the slur is under embedding, it is not attributed to the subject;
the nasty feeling that people might get when they hear utterances like (3), (4)
and (11) is due to a psychological eﬀect that depends on the beliefs and values
of the participants: that is oﬀense.
Hom's proposal is a very interesting one from several points of view. Nev-
ertheless, Hom's strategy to explain the scoping-out phenomenon is in fact to
claim that there is no scoping-out at all. This sounds quite counter-intuitive.
I believe that the derogation-oﬀense distinction doesn't reﬂect our intuitions
about slurs for two reasons: the ﬁrst one is that it's not clear why (9) and
(11) should display diﬀerent phenomena, as Hom claims, and we don't have
arguments to think that8; the second one is that the notion of oﬀense is char-
acterized as a subjective reaction and a psychological eﬀect; on the contrary,
slurs' derogatory power seems to be a conventional and objective fact.
To conclude, if one accepts the derogation-oﬀense distinction, then Hom's
strategy surely works well. Yet, this kind of distinction doesn't oﬀer us a good
description of how slurs work.
In the following section, I will present pragmatic theories that adopt another
strategy to account for the scoping-out.
2.2 Pragmatic strategies
Many authors ﬁnd that the best way to solve the scoping-out problem is to
claim that the derogatory content of a slur, i.e. the content that scopes out, is
not part of its truth-conditional meaning: the pragmatic accounts of slurs hold
that faggot is equivalent to homosexual with respect to the truth-conditional
meaning. The diﬀerence between a pejorative term and its neutral counterpart
is a matter of pragmatic meaning. Let us consider the following utterances:
11. John is a kike.
12. John is Jewish.
According to pragmatic strategies, (11) and (12) share the same truth-conditional
content. The reason why (11) is derogatory and (12) is not needs to be explained
addressing some components of meaning apart from truth-conditions. On this
regard, diﬀerent pragmatic accounts oﬀer various solutions: some authors, like
Christopher Potts9, analyze the derogatory content of slurs in terms of con-
ventional implicatures (CI), some others, like Philippe Schlenker10, in terms of
presuppositions.
Consider the sentences (11)-(13): pragmatic strategies hold that (11) and
(12) have the same truth-conditions, but (11) also activates something along
the lines of (13).
8The fact that people might have diﬀerent intuitions about the derogation in (9) and (11)
suggest that the best way to investigate the derogation-oﬀense distinction is to conduct a
study with ordinary informants.
9See Potts (2003, 2012).
10See Schlenker (2007).
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13. Jewish people are despicable for being Jewish.
What kind of thing is (13)? This is where the CI and the presuppositional
accounts diverge. But apart from the labeling of (13), the two accounts seem to
work more or less the same way. At the beginning of this section, I mentioned
a good reason to endorse pragmatic approaches, namely that they can explain
the scoping-out of the derogatory content; let's now consider the diﬃculties that
pragmatic accounts meet. I'm going to brieﬂy sketch the CI strategy's problems
and then I'll focus on the objections against the presuppositional account in
more detail.
The problem that the CI account meets is not properly explanatory; rather,
it depends on the very notion of conventional implicature. On the one hand, the
notion itself seems to be an obscure one11, and on the other hand, it seems to
be not that enlightening after all. After we called CI a non truth-conditional
component of slurs' meaning, we are still in need of an explanation of what kind
of phenomenon it is. It seems to me that classifying a component of meaning as
conventional implicature does not provide us with a more enlightened insight:
it's rather just a labeling. One very basic and yet essential question that remains
unanswered is: what are exactly CI and how/why are they activated by slurs12?
Let's now turn our attention to the presuppositional approach. Presupposi-
tions tell us something more about how a slur works. A pragmatic presuppo-
sition - understood à la Stalnaker - is, roughly speaking, something taken for
granted: it's a requirement on the common ground. First, this is a possible de-
scription of how slurs work: when a speaker S utters (11), the truth-conditional
meaning of (11) is that John is Jewish; but besides that, the utterance of (11)
also activates a requirement on the common ground, namely that the common
ground needs to include or to be compatible with something like (13), Jew-
ish people are despicable for being Jewish. Besides, just like presuppositional
words, slurs trigger a certain proposition even when they are embedded. This is
(more or less) how a presuppositional account would describe slurs' behaviour.
In addition to this description, the presuppositional strategy also accounts for
another peculiarity, discussed for example in Camp (2013), Croom (2011, 2013)
and Richard (2008): when someone uses a slur in a conversation, usually all
the participants seem to accept and share the speaker's derogatory attitude to-
ward the target group, unless they oppose to that explicitly. Using a slurring
word creates a sort of complicity between the speaker and the participants in
the conversation: if no one of the participants says anything, they get to be
party to the oﬀense towards the target group. A plausible explanation for this
phenomenon is the one provided by the presuppositional account on slurs: the
11See Bach (1999).
12As I said, my perplexities about the CI account depend on its explanatory power; on
the other hand, Hedger (2013) oﬀers arguments against this kind of account (pp. 208-211).
Hedger ﬁnds that slurs' derogatory content behaves diﬀerently from conventional implicatures
when they are under embedding (denials and questions, for instance). Hedger proposes a
purely expressive analysis of slurs, which I don't endorse. According to Hedger slurs cannot
be analyzed in terms of conventional implicatures because the content of an implicature must
be truth-evaluable, whereas the content of an expressive is not.
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utterance of a slur activates a requirement on the common ground, so that all
the participants are taken to share the speaker's derogatory attitude. In order
to avoid that, they need to say something, stop the conversation and prevent
the derogatory presupposition from getting into the conversational background.
As a matter of fact, according to some authors like Josep Macià and Philippe
Schlenker, the most intuitive explanation for slurs is that they work as triggers
for presuppositions. Nevertheless, this approach gave rise to several objections.
In the following section I will consider the main objections formulated against
the presuppositional account and I will try to counter them.
3 Objections to the presuppositional account
Some objections have been raised against the presuppositional account. I will
divide them into two groups, labeling them as strong and weaker objections.
First, I will consider the strong objection, that deals with cancellability. This
has often been viewed as the strongest objection to the presuppositional ac-
count13, but I will argue that it doesn't necessarily constitute a knocking down
problem for the theory. Then, I will consider the weaker objections, perplexi-
ties concerning the fact that the presuppositional account doesn't really reﬂect
our intuitions. My aim is to show how the objections against the presupposi-
tional account are not so evident after all.
3.1 Strong objections
The strongest objection raised against the presuppositional account deals with
cancellability14. Presuppositions are usually characterized in handbooks as hav-
ing certain features, such as projection, accommodation and cancellability15.
According to the cancellability requirement, presuppositions should be can-
cellable, for example by conditionalization; we see that (14) presupposes (15);
but (16), obtained by modifying (14), doesn't presuppose (15) anymore.
14. John stopped beating his wife.
15. John used to beat his wife.
16. John stopped beating his wife, if he ever did beat her.
17. # John is a faggot, if homosexuals are despicable for being homosexual.
Nevertheless, cancellation by conditionalization doesn't work with slurs: if we
take (9) and we generate (17), we get a quite inconsistent and anomalous
sentence.
13See for example Kaplan (1999), Potts (2007), Anderson and Lepore (2013a).
14The cancellability argument was proposed by Saul Kripke in a conversation with David
Kaplan, who mentioned it in Kaplan (1999). It might be for its illustrious proponents or for
its technical ﬂavor that this objection seemed so convincing.
15See, among the others, Chierchia (1990).
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Consider now the strong objection; the cancellability-argument against the
presuppositional account can be sketched as follows:
P1 Presuppositions need to be cancellable;
P2 The derogatory content of slurs is not cancellable;
C The derogatory content of slurs is not a presupposition.
A defender of the presuppositional account might try two strategies to reject
this argument: objecting to the ﬁrst or the second premise. We are going to try
them both.
3.1.1 Objecting P1
As we said, cancellability is often mentioned among the salient characterizing
features of presuppositions. But it's not obvious at all that presuppositions
need to be always cancellable, nor that they should be equally cancellable. It
can be argued that cancellability is a matter of grade: some can be harder
to cancel than others. Consider (18)-(19): supposing that the cancellation by
conditionalization works in (18) - and this is not that clear - surely it doesn't
work in (19), that turns out to be quite an odd sentence16.
18. The king of France is bald, if there is a king of France.
19. # I pick my sister up at the airport, if I have a sister.
As a matter of fact, many authors questioned this point. It's not accidental
though that the ones who focus on the non cancellability of some presupposi-
tions are the ones who analyse the so-called conventional implicatures in terms
of presuppositions17. If a theory takes for granted that a presupposition has
to be cancellable as it was a kind of dogma, that's because it assumes can-
cellability to be the dividing feature between presuppositions and conventional
implicatures. But is it so obvious that they are diﬀerent phenomena? They
are non-truth-conditional components of meaning, they tend to scope out of
semantic embedding, they are triggered by certain lexical items, or certain ex-
pressions. What I would like to suggest here is that cancellability is not a crucial
test; rather we should say that presuppositions can be cancelled, but not all in
the same way, nor with the same easiness.
What still needs to be explained is why some presuppositions are harder to
cancel than others. A preliminary hint might be that the variance in cancellabil-
ity probably depends on conventionality: the more a presupposition is linked to
a certain lexical item, the more diﬃcult it will be to cancel it. If we want to call
CI those presuppositions that are really hard to cancel, that's ﬁne; but I don't
16This doesn't mean that it's completely impossible to imagine a situation were (19) can
be uttered felicitously: just that it's very diﬃcult. The cancellation in (19) might be hard for
pragmatic reasons: usually, when people use the expression my sister, they know they have
a sister; on the other hand, we could propose a similar explanation for slurs: when people use
derogatory epithets, they are usually conveying a derogation toward the target group and it's
really hard to imagine a case in which they use a slur, but they don't convey any derogation.
17See for example Soames (1989).
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ﬁnd it very explanatory. The relation between CI and presuppositions surely
asks for further investigation, which might reconsider the role of cancellability.
If we take slurs' derogatory content to be presuppositional, slurs can be
considered triggers of lexical presuppositions that are very hard to cancel. In
the next section, I will focus on slurs' cancellability.
3.1.2 Objecting P2
Another way to bring into question the cancellability argument against the
presuppositional account is to show that the derogatory content of slurs can
sometimes be cancelled. I'm going to consider two cases.
The ﬁrst non-derogatory use of slurs is the appropriation case. An ap-
propriated use of a slur is a case in which a target group member addresses
another in-group with a slur, without being derogatory but conveying on the
contrary a feeling of solidarity with the target group and dissociation from cer-
tain discriminatory habits and beliefs: for example, it is very common among
African-Americans to use nigger in a non-derogatory way18. Brontsema (2004)
calls this phenomenon linguistic reclamation or counter-appropriation and
analyses the on-going process of appropriation that involves the slur queer. A
peculiarity of appropriated uses is that they are initially available only for the
members of the target group; gradually, the appropriated non-derogatory use
can be extended to out-groups: for instance, everybody can talk about queer
studies even if in other contexts the term is still used as a pejorative. Finally,
a slur can deﬁnitely change its meaning becoming a neutral term; the process of
appropriation is then over and the term can always be used in a non-derogatory
way by anyone: that's the case of gay, which is no longer a slur.
The appropriated use represents a problem to most of the theories, since
the slur's meaning seems to change in those contexts. For this reason, ap-
propriation has been the object of theoretical research (for instance Brontsema
(2004), Croom (2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c)), but also of empirical research
(Galinsky et al. (2003), Galinsky et al. (2013)).
Bianchi (2014) oﬀers an account of appropriated uses that does not need
to postulate any meaning change and that takes inspiration from Relevance
Theory. Bianchi (2014) holds that an appropriated use of a slur is an echoic use
of language: while echoing some derogatory practice or widely shared thought,
the target group member also expresses her dissociative and mocking attitude
to it. Thus, according to this theory, appropriated uses are ironical uses.
Nevertheless, even if appropriated uses are a clearly non-derogatory case,
they are not such a good example for our purpose here: if Bianchi is correct, then
an ironical use of a slur wouldn't count as a case in which the derogatory content
is cancelled; on the one hand, what we call cancellability for presuppositions
doesn't involve non-literal uses of language such as irony, and on the other,
irony allows us to do almost all sort of things, such as to subvert the truth-
conditional meaning of an utterance. In short, irony is not a good way to
18See for example Kennedy (2003).
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account for presuppositions' cancellation.
If we set apart Bianchi's proposal, we would probably have to accept that
in the appropriated uses slurs change their meaning. Still, presuppositions'
cancellation doesn't involve a change of meaning.
If these observations about appropriated uses are correct, another example
is needed. A better option is the case of pedagogical uses, as Hom called them.
Let's see some examples from Hom (2008)19:
20. Chinese people are not chinks.
21. Institutions that treat Chinese as chinks are morally depraved.
If one agrees with Hom and ﬁnds that in (20)-(21) slurs are not oﬀensive, it's
easier to bring into question the argument against the presuppositional account,
since one would reject the second premise. On this, I'm afraid we can only refer
to our own intuitions20.
Nevertheless, the argument can still be challenged objecting the ﬁrst premise,
as we saw in the previous section. What I would like to conclude here is that
the non-cancellability of slurs' derogatory content is at least not as obvious as
it is often taken to be.
3.2 Weaker objections
In this sections I will assess some objections against the presuppositional account
that question the intuitive character and the explanatory power of the strategy.
Richard (2008) argued against the presuppositional account trying to show
how it turns out to be a misdiagnosis of how slurs work21: according to Richard,
the explanation that the account oﬀers doesn't capture what really matters: if
we call someone with a slur, we are not pushing something in the conversa-
tional background, but rather, we are insulting the addressee. The ﬁrst thing
to account for is this negative attitude: slurs are oﬀensive words used to insult
someone, not devices to slip assumptions into the conversational background.
Several answers to this point could be oﬀered. The ﬁrst one is that pre-
supposing something doesn't need to be considered as a secondary aim of an
utterance; indeed, it can be the main point. Something like that happens in the
case of the so-called informative presupposition22. Suppose for example that I
am very proud of my new moped and I want everybody to notice I have a new
moped, to make them feel envy; so, I utter (22):
19Hom (2008), p. 429.
20I didn't mention metalinguistic uses of slurs, treated for example by Hornsby (2001). I
don't think that such uses should be considered derogatory, but on the other hand I don't
think that they should count as relevant non-derogatory uses for the simple fact that the slur
is not used, but mentioned. If I believed that mentioning a slur was derogatory, I could not
have even written this paper.
21Richard (2008), pp. 21-22.
22Stalnaker (2002), Simons (2004) and Schlenker (2007) underline how the main point of
an utterance triggering an informative presupposition is the presupposition itself.
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22. I'll be on time, thanks to my moped.
The utterance of (22) has as its main objective to tell everyone I have a moped.
It's not so counter-intuitive that what a slur does is to trigger a presupposition:
this derogatory presupposition can be the whole point of uttering a slur. On the
one hand it is a means to communicate how the speaker feels about a certain
target group and on the other it is a way to strengthen the common beliefs
among the participants to a conversation.
This is my ﬁrst point: the whole purpose of an utterance can sometimes rely
on what it presupposes.
Let's move to Richard's second objection: if a person gets insulted with a
slurring word, it doesn't mean that a derogatory presupposition slips into the
conversational record. According to Richard, when you call someone with a slur,
the main thing to account for is a malevolent attitude, not a derogatory presup-
position. In order to address Richard's perplexity, it's useful to distinguish an
aggressive attitude from meaning. Imagine that someone utters the following
sentence: Shut up, woman. In this case, the use of woman is clearly an insult,
even if woman usually has a neutral meaning and there's surely nothing despi-
cable about being a woman. The insulting eﬀect is in part due to the aggressive
attitude of the speaker and it doesn't depend on linguistic features of the pred-
icate woman, but rather on prosody, on mind reading, intention-ascription,
widespread beliefs etc23.
Let us get back to Richard: according to him, when you call someone with
a slur it's not enough to say that you are triggering a presupposition; according
to Richard, you need to account for the malevolent attitude. But just like the
previous woman-example, the malevolent and aggressive attitude conveyed in
the insult doesn't need to rely entirely on linguistic features. In addition to that,
we can also express violence violating a linguistic taboo in uttering bad words.
Of course some predicates are more likely to be used as insults than others;
but this is due to historical reasons, it depends on who has been persecuted
or discriminated.If we imagine a parallel universe in which English people were
subjected to discrimination and violence for centuries, "limey" would probably
sound like a very oﬀensive word24. The same holds for non slurring words: it's
23It is worth noticing that the aggressive attitude can be completely independent of the
meaning (in a very broad sense) of a word. Take this story as a funny case. When my little
brother was three he learnt bad words from older boys at school. Telling him not to utter
those words was the best way to encourage him to go on. So this is what my parents did:
they told him that turacciolo was a very bad word. It actually means cork and there
is no way in which it could sound oﬀensive. We all started to use turacciolo at home as
an insult, making angry faces and using an aggressive tone of voice. Obviously, my brother
started using turacciolo and he forgot the actual bad words he learnt (for some time, at
least). I agree that my brother didn't know the real meaning of turacciolo, he used it in a
non-orthodox way, so he wouldn't count as a competent user of the word; nevertheless, I ﬁnd
this little anecdote instructive, since the speaker used a word as a generic bad word, without
associating any precise descriptive content to it. Turacciolo became an insult in virtue of
features that are not related to its meaning, but to the intentions of the people who used it.
24Hom (2008), pp. 426 and 433 proposes a similar point and talks about derogatory
variation. About how slurs' derogatory power changes diachronically, see Cupkovic G. (2014).
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more diﬃcult to use man as an insult than it is to use woman, but this
doesn't depend on what these two predicates mean25.
So this is my second point: the aggressive attitude conveyed by insults could
depend on factors other than the predicate's meaning.
In sum, in this section I tried to address some of the perplexities about the
pre-suppositional account; I distinguished between two diﬀerent uses of slurs:
when someone is directly insulted with a slur and when a slur is predicated
of someone. I sketched an account like the following: a slur is a lexical item
that conventionally triggers a presupposition; with respect to the conversational
background, the presupposition triggered by the slur can be already part of the
conversational background; when it is not, it can be intentionally used as an
informative presupposition or not; in both cases, it can be non problematic and
easily accepted into the conversational record; in case it is problematic, it can
be ignored or rejected explicitly.When we use a slur towards a person, what we
are doing is triggering a presupposition and - at the same time - showing our
aggressive and derogatory attitude through factors other than meaning.
4 What kind of presupposition?
So far, I considered the objections against the presuppositional account and I
tried to formulate some replies; yet, a presuppositional account must also specify
what kind of presupposition slurs trigger.
In this section I would like to consider the two main options and discuss
them.
Let's take wop as an example: a ﬁrst intuitive hypothesis, very common
in the literature26 and mentioned in Section 2, is that (23) triggers the presup-
position (24):
23. I don't do business with wops.
24. Italians are despicable because of being Italian.
If this is the case, Richard might be quite correct in noticing that, according to
this account, when one calls someone a slur, a derogatory presupposition gets
into the conversational background if it is not explicitly rejected:: this has the
paradoxical consequence that if someone uses the word wop and I decide to
ignore it because this person doesn't even deserve my explicit dissent, it means
that I accept that Italians are despicable because of being Italian. Of course
we mean acceptance as Stalnaker (2002) does, i.e. distinguishing acceptance
from belief. Nevertheless, there are still cases - like the imagined one - in
which it's not that clear that the participants in a conversation always need to
accept that the target class is despicable, even if we mean "to accept" in the
Stalnakerian sense.
25About the factors that aﬀect how we perceive derogation, see O'Dea C.J. et al. (2014)
and Saucier (2014).
26See for example Hom (2008, 2010) about CI.
12
Perhaps on the basis of similar considerations, Schlenker (2007) avoids this
unwelcome consequence, analyzing the presupposition triggered by honky - a
slur that targets white people - as having the following features. The presuppo-
sition is:
indexical (it is evaluated with respect to a context), attitudinal (it pred-
icates something of the mental state of the agent of that context), and
sometimes shiftable (the context of evaluation need not be the context of
the actual utterance). [...] we evaluate each lexical entry with respect to
a context (c) and a world (w). [...]
[[ honky]] (c)(w) 6= # iﬀ the agent of c believes in the world of c that
white people are despicable. If 6=#, [[ honky]] (c)(w) = [[ white]] (c)(w).27
Another option along the line of Schlenker's proposal28 is to describe the pre-
supposition triggered by (23) as:
25. The 'wop'-user despises Italians for being Italian.
I chose the predicate to despise instead of to believe, because I ﬁnd that it
expresses better what a slur does: a slur conveys via presupposition how the
speaker feels about the target class. As a matter of fact, the presuppositional
strategy has seemed a little too descriptive to some authors, such as, as we said
in Section 3, Richard (2008); but if we understand the presupposition triggered
as I suggested, or as Schlenker proposed, it doesn't just describe objectively a
state of aﬀairs, but rather it expresses how the speaker feels.
An account like that needs to provide an explanation for the complicity-
phenomenon, i.e. the fact that in many cases, when someone utters a slur, the
participants to the conversation need to say something if they don't want to
be party to the derogatory attitude: if the presupposition regards the speaker's
feelings and attitudes, there shouldn't be such a phenomenon. This could be a
possible solution: the complicity-phenomenon doesn't have to be an exclusively
linguistic feature of how slurs work but it might depend on social factors. The
reason why people need to step up when a slur is uttered is not that if they
don't a presupposition like (24) will slip into the conversational background; the
reason is that for people belonging to an egalitarian community it's not accept-
able to disapprove or condemn individuals on the basis of race, gender, sexual
orientation, nationality and so on. The more a derogatory attitude has been
put into practice (discrimination, violence, persecution), the more unacceptable
this attitude is: the display of such derogatory attitude is a violation of a social
norm. What I would like to suggest is that our need for dissent when we hear
something like (23) doesn't prove that the presupposition activated must be
something like (24); in fact, it could be something like (25) instead: the reason
why we need to intervene in this latter case is that we cannot accept someone's
despise toward the target group. We can imagine non-presuppositional cases
in which some beliefs are just not acceptable to such an extent that the hearer
needs to step up. Compare (26) and (27):
27Schlenker (2007), pp. 237-238.
28See also Predelli (2010).
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26. I don't want to talk with a faggot.
27. I'm not a bad person, I just despise homosexuals because they're homose-
xual.
The utterance of (27) would probably prompt a non-homophobic person to
intervene, even if (27) doesn't let a presupposition slip into the conversational
background. This example shows how a hearer often needs to step up even if
the derogatory belief is not ascribable to the hearer, since here it is not entered
into the common background.
Nevertheless, the diﬀerences between (26) and (27) are at least two: the ﬁrst
one is that the speaker of (27) asserts what the speaker of (26) presupposes; the
second one is that in (26) the speaker breaks two diﬀerent norms at the same
time: a political one, just like in (27), and a social-linguistic one, since, unlike
in (27), it contains a taboo word.
In sum, there are at least two main options about what kind of presupposi-
tion slurs trigger29. The ﬁrst option is that the presupposition describes a state
of aﬀairs about the target group (the target group is despicable for being so):
let's call it the objective option (OO); the second option is that the presup-
position expresses how the speaker feels about the target group (the slur-user
despises the target group): let's call it the subjective option (SO). On the one
hand, the OO has an easier explanation for the complicity-phenomenon; on the
other hand, the SO accounts better for the expressive content of a slur. I cannot
formulate a crucial test that allows us to see which one is the correct one, since
the explanations that the two options can oﬀer are not so diﬀerent. In fact,
the OO-SO opposition closely resembles the debate about attitude sentences'
presuppositions; consider the following examples:
28. Mary wants to call her brother.
29. Mary has a brother.
30. Mary believes she has a brother.
Some scholars hold that (28) presupposes (29), some that it presupposes (30),
some others that it presupposes both30. The dilemma here is quite similar:
either the presupposition is a state of aﬀairs (Mary has a brother), either it
regards the speaker's beliefs (Mary believes she has a brother) and I think
that for slurs both OO and SO are available; we probably could infer one from
the other and this might be the reason why it's not easy to see which is the
presupposition triggered and which is the inference31.
29Predelli (2010) oﬀers a distinction on the same lines and he tends to prefer the subjective
account (pp. 178-180).
30About this debate, see for example Karttunen (1974), Heim (1992), Beaver and Geurts
(2010).
31Compare to Beaver and Geurts (2010)'s table.
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The speaker despises the target class The target class is despicable
Option OO inference presupposition
Option SO presupposition inference
5 Conclusions
In this paper I defended a presuppositional account of slurs. I suggested that
cancellability should be thought of as a matter of grade, rather than the di-
viding feature between two diﬀerent categories. Once we re-think the notion of
cancellability, the main objections against the presuppositional account do not
hold anymore. Apart from the labeling, the question that needs to be posed is
what kind of phenomenon we are dealing with.
I ﬁnd that the best explanation for how slurs work is to say that a slur
is a lexical item that conventionally triggers a presupposition; the presupposi-
tion triggered by a slur is often an informative presupposition, that expresses
the speaker's derogatory attitude toward the target group. In addition to trig-
gering a presupposition, uttering a slur is also a violation of a sociolinguistic
taboo in societies that reject discrimination on the basis of race, gender, sexual
orientation, nationality and so on.
I think that such an account reﬂects our intuitions about slurs and explains
phenomena like scoping-out and complicity.
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